It began with belief
in building on Bitcoin.
In 2023, Ordinals and BRC-20 arrived on Bitcoin. OSHI was a BRC-20 inscription token whose team set out to build an AMM for the Bitcoin ecosystem.
Inscribing one OSHI initially cost roughly $2. Its price later reached more than $2,000—about 1,000 times the inscription cost. But the product was never delivered, and the price eventually collapsed.
MotoSwap’s two founders, Danny (@0xplainview) and Chad (@chadmasterxbt), split the OSHI community, citing allegations of fraud and token dumping by the original OSHI founders.
We followed the new team because we still believed the original ambition could be fulfilled. We wanted more than a rising token price. We wanted a working product.
A new protocol.
The same community believing again.
Next came CBRC-20, promoted by Danny and Chad’s team. They deployed its first token, BORD. Public records already described the protocol and BORD in December 2023; our community’s experience of this phase continued into 2024.
OSHI holders received MOTO at 1:1,000. OSHI’s 13,337-token supply corresponded to 13,337,000 CBRC-20 MOTO.
But the team blacklisted some addresses from the airdrop. The exclusions included OSHI held by the original team, holders on AscendEX, holders through UniSat’s BRC-20 Swap, and some OSHI whales. None received the airdrop for those balances.
All the MOTO corresponding to the blacklisted balances went to Danny and Chad. The distribution of those tokens was never made public. It was something we knew in the old community at the time, although we did not preserve the evidence.
Initially, the team treated BORD as its flagship. It became popular in the Chinese community and rose sharply. The team later shifted its support to MOTO, leading to arguments within the community. Most of the Chinese community left CBRC-20, and BORD lost its value.
People had invested more than money.
They had built a community around the project.
Danny’s original plan was to deploy MotoSwap on CBRC-20. About half a year later, they abandoned that direction, saying the developers had done a terrible job.
They then brought in Anakun, presented as a “genius developer,” to build OP_NET from scratch. The plan was to launch within six months. Instead, the launch was postponed repeatedly, with audit problems and necessary changes given as the reasons.
In 2024, Danny’s team also promoted a token called LKY. Our understanding at the time was that they were the team actually running it.
Two and a half years of waiting.
Then another departure.
OP_NET finally launched in March 2026. For nearly two and a half years, from the OSHI split to that launch, the MOTO community had kept supporting the team.
The community’s conviction and trust sustained the project. In my experience, MOTO’s market cap remained above $10 million during that period. The team repeatedly sold MOTO to raise money, citing the needs of project development.
They also issued 10,000 Motocat NFTs on Ordinals and raised about $750,000. Most of that support came from the MOTO community. People complained, but they never gave up.
OP_NET also received $5 million in equity funding. That was funding for OP_NET, recorded separately from the community’s purchases of MOTO and NFTs.
MOTO on OP_NET had a total supply of 1 billion: 50% for CBRC-20 MOTO holders, 5% for Motocat NFT holders, 10% for liquidity mining and the remaining 35% for the team. The old community now held only half the new supply. Despite the dilution of our share, we accepted it.
We had already waited so long.
We still wanted it to succeed.
After launch, liquidity problems prevented the project from gaining market acceptance and left it at an impasse. The team took no corrective action and did not listen to the community’s suggestions. Only about a month later, they announced that they were abandoning this direction on OP_NET and taking MotoSwap to Ethereum, saying it had more capital and users.
They dissolved the groups.
They deleted the messages.
The team then dissolved all the existing community groups, deleted the messages in them and stopped communicating with the old community. They cleared away the places where we had spent years discussing, waiting and supporting the project.
As I recall, Danny referred to the old community as “the Poors” in a private conversation with a large holder. The chat was forwarded among community members at the time, but the original record is no longer available to independently verify the exact wording or full context.
That forwarded conversation is why the name stayed with us.
Years of support.
And in the end: “the Poors.”
New users arrived.
The old community was left behind.
In September 2026, MotoSwap began its Ethereum phase and issued 20,000 Motocat NFTs. 5% went to original Ordinals holders and 95% were offered as free mints. Connecting an X account could get a user 20 Motocats.
These campaigns had not been publicized in advance. Together with what happened at the token launch, that led me to suspect substantial insider involvement. That is my suspicion, not an established identification of the wallets.
MOTO’s total supply expanded from 1 billion on OP_NET to 10 billion on Ethereum—a tenfold increase. Only 10% was allocated to OP_NET MOTO holders, automatically staked for 12 months; 40% went into the initial liquidity pool.
The token opened at an extremely low price, and early addresses were already buying. Only about two hours after trading began, when the market cap had reached roughly $30 million, did the team officially announce MOTO’s launch and publish the token address. I am certain of that gap between trading and the announcement. I suspected insider participation among those buyers, but the material available here does not establish their identities.
The team used high-yield farming to attract people to buy MOTO. The price then kept falling, with the market cap dropping from about $30 million to around $4 million.
Ten times the supply.
One tenth for the old community, locked for a year.
Over those three years, many people in the MOTO community had invested effort, money and emotion. In the end, the team discarded us when we were no longer useful to them.
Ethereum MOTO contract: 0xbd965230588eaa536de6aa45e8ebbc01638535e0
A project can fail.
Trust should not be treated this way.
Looking back, I ask myself whether OSHI’s original collapse could have involved Danny’s own selling, while the blame went to the OSHI team. From BORD to MOTO, was the aim all along to extract as much money as possible from the community?
Or perhaps they really did start with good intentions. Perhaps, when the Bitcoin ecosystem could no longer attract users, they decided that moving forward meant abandoning the old community and its large MOTO holdings.
These are my reflections and suspicions, not established findings about motives or selling. I have not provided transaction evidence here that proves these theories.
Many people will say we do not deserve sympathy. We made our own choices, lacked judgment and trusted others too much. Many of us really were unusually kind and honest. The old MOTO community included some extraordinarily helpful people.
We cannot undo what happened. We can share it as a warning for those who come after us. I believe most of the old community will not participate in MotoSwap again.
Crypto has plenty of scammers. It also has good people and responsible teams. Project failure is not what frightens us; crypto projects are inherently risky. We made our investment decisions, and we bear the consequences.
What we cannot accept is being played again and again: having our trust used to raise money, then being discarded and mocked by the team. Years of support, answered with “the Poors.”
But do we, “the Poors,”
have to accept that as the ending?
We should come together and build our own community. Not only the MOTO community, but the countless people hurt by other projects. We should not keep being deceived, or feel ashamed to speak because we once believed.
We want a community and a culture of our own, where we remember these experiences and look out for each other.
This is my lived experience, and what Poor means. MOTO is where we came from. It is not where the story ends.
We still want
public answers.
How was the MOTO corresponding to excluded OSHI balances distributed and used? Publish the snapshot, allocation accounts and associated wallets.
How were the proceeds from token sales and NFTs spent? How much of the cost did the old community bear, and what accounting did it receive?
Why did trading open about two hours before the address was announced to the community? Who knew beforehand, and were the early addresses connected?
Why dissolve the existing groups, delete the messages and stop communicating? Why did years of community support end in mockery?
Surviving announcements, screenshots, allocation records and transaction links can make this file more complete. Other participants are welcome to contribute, and the people involved are welcome to provide verifiable responses.
Send public sources or corrections to @poorclubfun. As of 7 October 2026, this file has not collected a project-team response; that absence is not evidence against anyone.
Sources &
corrections.
This reading list supports the specific points identified in the chapter notes. External pages can change; linking them is not the same as preserving an independent copy.
- AscendEX — OSHIPublished token information; listed OSHI supply.
- UniSat — OSHI marketRecorded sales; does not alone establish initial mint cost or a complete price history.
- OrdinalHub — What is CBRC-20?11 December 2023; describes the standard and BORD. Cybord specification ↗
- OP_NET — Mainnet announcementProject statement about the protocol’s launch.
- OP_NET — $5 million equity roundProject funding announcement. Dated supporting notice · 12 March 2026 ↗
- Motocat Racing Club — whitelist raffleAdvertised collection size, sale tiers and token entitlement; not a record of completed proceeds.
- MotoSwap — MOTO · Tokenomics · MotocatsCurrent project documentation, reviewed 7 October 2026; not a substitute for earlier versions.
- MotoSwap — official contract addresses · Contract referenceEthereum MOTO address and the current documentation’s 10 billion supply; not a replacement for historical distribution terms.